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with Renegotiations
Summary
This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement
under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to
stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans
and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine
the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions
are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its
membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our
condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of
welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement.
Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the
first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations.
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1

Introduction

Efficient management of the global commons such as stability of climatic conditions and the
conservation of biodiversity requires a grand coalition of the nation states responsible for
environmental regulation and legislation. However, the grand coalition will generally not be
stable as individual countries have an incentive to take a free-rider position in the provision of
such global environmental goods. This paper examines the options to establish a stable
international climate agreement (ICA) that comes as close as possible to the first best – but
generally unstable – grand coalition. The notion of stability we employ is crucial. We use the
concept of internal and external stability. A coalition is said to be stable if and only if no
coalition member has an incentive to leave (internal stability) and no non-member has an
incentive to join (external stability); cf. d’Aspremont et al. (1983). This notion of stability is
applicable when the membership decision is taken only once (and for all). As we will relax
this assumption and allow for renegotiations, we will introduce an appropriate refinement of
the stability concept in Section 2 below.
There exists by now an extensive literature on the stability of international environmental
agreements. Here we focus on games where a single agreement is proposed that can be signed
or not. This class of games is usually called cartel games with open membership. Different
solution concepts have been employed to analyse this type of game. Hoel (1992) considers a
‘constrained social optimum’ where social net benefits from greenhouse gas (GHG)
abatement are maximised subject to an individual rationality constraint that requires that
coalition members gain compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. Eyckmans (1999)
examines coalition stability for uniform abatement efforts using a similar individual
rationality constraint. Individual rationality is also a condition of the core solutions considered
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by e.g. Chander and Tulkens (1995). It is implicitly assumed that a coalition would completely
dissolve if a coalition member leaves. By contrast the notion of (internal and external)
stability implicitly assumes that the remaining coalition stays intact if a coalition member
leaves. Only single deviations are considered. One might call this the pessimistic view where
deviations occur whenever they are immediately profitable. Solution concepts relying on
individual rationality are more optimistic in the sense that players are assumed to always stick
to a coalition if their coalition payoff exceeds their non-cooperative payoff. In this paper we
take a pessimistic – or cautious – view.
We explore the stability of international climate agreements. Each player (countries or
regions) chooses whether or not to sign the agreement and become a member of a unique
coalition (the climate agreement). Then the coalition and the remaining singletons fix their
abatement levels playing a Nash-Cournot game. As abatement is a pure public good, the
equilibrium of the abatement game is generally inefficient. Only the coalition of all, the grand
coalition, would overcome the inefficiency. The literature on cartel membership games has
emphasised, however, that large coalitions, including the grand coalition, are only stable if
gains from cooperation are small, that is, whenever coalition formation is rather unimportant.
If gains from cooperation are large, the analysis of cartel games shows that only small
coalitions that achieve relatively little are stable (e.g. Barrett 1994, Finus and Rundshagen
2003). These results have been obtained for models with identical players and do not
generalise when players differ (see Weikard 2005). Our results in this paper are also in
contrast to these earlier findings. We show that there are options to stabilise successful ICAs.
There are three main drivers of our result.
First, we consider asymmetric countries. With asymmetric countries, in particular when
countries differ in abatement cost, a coalition can exploit cheap abatement options if a low
cost country joins the coalition. Low cost countries are attractive as coalition partners.
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Second, we consider transfers between coalition members. Transfers or, more precisely, the
sharing of the coalition payoff among members can be used to set incentives for low cost
countries to join the coalition. In the debate on climate change policies a number of different
sharing rules for international climate agreements have been suggested; see Rose et al. (1998).
Only few studies have addressed the impacts of different sharing rules on the stability of
international climate agreements. Bosello et al. (2003) consider sharing rules for abatement
costs, Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) consider sharing rules for tradable emission
permits and Weikard, Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera (2006) consider sharing rules for the
gains from cooperation. The differences are crucial. If sharing rules are applied to costs or
permits, there is no guarantee that payoffs satisfy the individual rationality constraint. By
contrast, if sharing is applied to the gains from cooperation, individual rationality is always
satisfied as long as a coalition is at all profitable, i.e. it achieves at least the sum of what its
members can achieve without cooperation. Recently a class of sharing rules has been
proposed that divides the difference between the coalition payoff and the sum of the outside
option payoffs of coalition members (Eyckmans and Finus 2004, Fuentes-Albero and Rubio
2005, Weikard 2005, Carraro et al. 2006, McGinty 2007). The outside option payoff is the
payoff a player would receive when leaving the coalition. It is obvious that the internal
stability condition can only be met when the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the outside
option payoffs. On the other hand, if the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the outside
option payoffs, then well-designed transfers can guarantee internal stability. Here we adopt an
adjusted “optimal sharing rule” designed for a setting with renegotiations.
Third, we allow for renegotiations of the agreement. Renegotiations improve the incentives to
join a coalition. Players may be forced to cooperate at the first stage if there is a credible threat
of punishment at the second stage. Moreover the second stage payoffs can be used to reward
members of the first stage agreement. Similar to our approach Ulph (2004) and Rubio and
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Ulph (2007) have studied renegotiations of international environmental agreements and
dynamic membership. However, their approach is confined to symmetric countries and does
not capture abatement cost differences and the impact of transfers to stabilise agreements.
To study the effects of optimally designed sharing rules in an empirical setting and to illustrate
their impacts we examine the stability of ICAs. We do this using the STACO model
introduced by Finus et al. (2006) and refined by Nagashima et al. (2006). STACO is a global
model comprising 12-regions for each of which abatement cost and benefit functions are
defined. The numerical analysis in this paper extends the work of Weikard, Finus and
Altamirano-Cabrera (2006) who consider results from the STACO model and compare
proportional sharing of gains from cooperation according to past emissions, regional income,
population and other indicators. They find that an emission-based proportional sharing rule
performs best in the sense that it stabilises a coalition that gives higher global net benefits and
lower stocks of carbon pollution than any other of the examined rules. However, as only a
limited set of rules was examined in that study, it remained an open question whether
coalitions can be stabilised that perform even better. Our analysis in this paper shows that an
optimal transfer rule gives significantly better results. If we do not consider renegotiations, we
find that there exist stable coalitions of up to 6 out of 12 regions. The best performing stable
coalition comprises 5 regions and achieves about 46% of the gains the Grand Coalition could
achieve as compared to non-cooperation. With renegotiations, considering two commitment
periods, we even find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period of 10 or 20
years, followed by a 5 regions coalition for the second commitment period. These agreements
achieve 59% of the potential gains over a century.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces optimal sharing rules for a
multi-period setting. Section 3 provides a brief overview of empirical specifications of the
STACO model for our case of ICAs. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
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2

Optimal sharing in Pareto perfect coalitions

We consider an open membership cartel formation game with renegotiations. That is, we
consider several but finitely many periods (commitment periods) in each of which a single
coalition or cartel (the ICA) can form. In each period t = 1,..., T individual countries i ∈ N
decide to join or not to join the agreement. Payoffs that accrue in period t depend on the
coalition formed in that period K t ⊆ N . Payoffs are determined from costs and benefits of
equilibrium abatement of GHGs in an abatement game that is specified in the next section.
Here it is sufficient to note that GHG abatement is a public good. It is well known for public
goods games that the grand coalition K = N is efficient, while any partial agreement with
K ⊂ N is not (e.g. Dasgupta 1982). In a public goods game a singleton coalition K = {i} will

not be effective and give the same payoffs as K = ∅ . We will refer to both cases as ‘allsingletons’. To be more precise about payoffs, the abatement game in period t invokes a
partition function V t ( K t ) that determines payoffs VKt for the coalition and for each singleton
player V jt ( K t ) , j ∉ K t in period t. Before we can introduce our notion of stability (of a
sequence of coalitions) we need to define individual payoffs for coalition members. We
assume that some sharing rule r applies that distributes the coalition payoff VK ( K ) among
members.1 Thus we arrive at a per-member partition function, also called a valuation function.
For convenience we denote it by V ( r K ) and individual payoffs under coalition K when
sharing rule r applies are denoted by Vi ( r K ) . Of course, for every sharing rule r we have

VK ( K ) = ∑ Vi ( r K ) . We adopt the shorthand notation K − i for K \{i} with i ∈ K and K + j for
i∈K

K ∪ { j} with j ∉ K . Define the coalition surplus S K ≡ VK ( K ) − ∑ Vi (K −i ) . We call Vi ( K − i )
i∈K

1

We skip the time-superscript where it is not essential.
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i’s outside option payoff or defection payoff. Note that it is, of course, independent of the
sharing rule applied by coalition K − i .
Now consider the final period T and consider the following class of sharing rules for coalition
KT :
Each coalition member i ∈ K T receives
ViT ( r K T ) = ViT ( K −Ti ) + si for all i ∈ K T ,
with

∑s

i

i∈K T

(1)

= S K T and

for all i ∈ K T , si ≥ 0 if and only if S K T ≥ 0 .
By construction, sharing according to (1) – optimal sharing – gives each coalition member at
least its outside option payoff if this is feasible, i.e. if S K T ≥ 0 . Hence, optimal sharing gives
priority to setting incentives to join the agreement. Weikard (2005) shows that every coalition
that is internally stable under some arbitrary sharing rule will also be internally stable under
the family of sharing rules characterised by (1). The underlying standard notion of stability is
as follows (d’Aspremont et al. 1983):
DEFINITION 1 A coalition K is stable under sharing rule r, if it is
(i) internally stable, i.e.

Vi ( r K ) ≥ Vi ( K − i ) for all i ∈ K ,

and
(ii) externally stable, i.e.
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V j ( K ) > V j ( r K + j ) for all j ∈ N \ K .2

In a setting with renegotiations, the notion of stability of Definition 1 has to be refined. First,
strictly speaking, the object of stability is no longer a coalition under a sharing rule r, but
rather sequence of coalitions coupled with sharing rules

r1

T

K 1 ,..., r K T . We adopt the

terminology that coalition r K t is generalised stable under sharing rule r if no member wants
to leave and no non-member wants to join. It is important to note that generalised stability of a
coalition in a given period may depend on the coalitions formed and the sharing rules applied
in other periods and therefore Definition 1 does not apply but needs refinement.
The coalition formation game we study is a finite sequential game and the equilibrium concept
employed is renegotiation proof equilibrium introduced by Farrell and Maskin (1989).3 This
equilibrium concept is a refinement of Selten’s (1965, 1975) subgame perfect equilibrium that
rules out the play of a Pareto dominated subgames in an equilibrium path of play. In the
following we will refer to it as Pareto perfect equilibrium.
Before formally defining Pareto perfect sequences of coalitions, we need to introduce some
further notation and a definition of generalised stability.
Denote by w KɶiT the stable coalition with sharing rule w that gives the worst payoff of all stable
coalitions to player i in period T, that is ViT ( w KɶiT ) ≤ ViT ( r K T ) for all stable r K T .
We can now recursively define generalised stability. A definition of Pareto perfect equilibrium
follows.

2

3

The tie-breaking rule is here that a player would join the coalition if she is indifferent between joining and
staying out. Hence, by this definition, the empty set ∅ is not externally stable, and a trivial coalition is
internally stable.
See also Bernheim and Ray (1989). A related but stronger equilibrium concept is Bernheim, Peleg and
Whinston’s (1987) coalition-proof equilibrium.
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DEFINITION 2 (i) In the last period a coalition K T is generalised stable under sharing
rule r T if and only if it is stable.
(ii) A sequence of coalitions

rT

r T −1

K T −1 , r K T is generalised stable if and only if
T

K T is generalised stable,

and for all i ∈ K T −1
T −1

ViT −1 ( r K T −1 ) + ViT ( r K T ) ≥ ViT ( K −Ti−1 ) + Vi T ( w KɶiT ) ,
T

(2)

and for all j ∈ N \ K T −1
T −1

V jT −1 ( K T −1 ) + V jT ( r K T ) > V jT −1 ( s K +T −j 1 ) + V jT ( w Kɶ Tj ) .
T

(3)

(iii) For longer sequences conditions for generalised stability can be established by
working backwards from (2) and (3). Let Wi t be the worst generally stable coalition
sequence for player i.
A sequence of coalitions of length T − t + 1 , i.e.
if the subsequence of length T − t , i.e.

r t +1

rt

T

K t ,..., r K T , is generalised stable

K t +1 ,..., r K T , is generalised stable and
T

if for all i ∈ K t

Vi t ( r K t ) +
t

T

∑V

τ=t +1

i

τ rτ

( K τ ) ≥ Vi t ( K −t i ) + Wi t +1 ,

and for all j ∈ N \ K t

V jt ( K t ) +

T

∑V

τ=t +1

τ rτ
j

( K τ ) > V jt ( s K +t j ) + W jt +1 .
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DEFINITION 3 (i) In the last period, coalition K T is Pareto perfect under sharing rule
r T if and only if it is stable and Pareto undominated by any other stable coalition.
(ii) A sequence of coalitions

rt

T

K t ,..., r K T

is Pareto perfect if and only if

it is generalised stable and Pareto undominated by any other generalised stable
sequence stretching from t to T
and all its subsequences

r t −1

K t −1 ,..., r K T ,
T

r t −2

K t − 2 ,..., r K T , …,
T

rT

KT

are

generalised stable and Pareto undominated.
In the remainder of the paper we confine the analysis to a two-period game, T = 2 . To extend
the analysis to more periods is straightforward, based on Definitions 2 and 3, but tedious.
For T = 2 , Vi 2 ( w Kɶi2 ) is the worst credible punishment that can be imposed on i in period 2.
Condition (2) requires of a Pareto perfect equilibrium

r1

2

K 1 , r K 2 that the payoff of a period-

1 coalition member (left hand side) is at least as large as the payoff from defecting from
coalition K 1 (right hand side). It is a credible threat that w Kɶi2 will be played as it is a Pareto
perfect subgame. Condition (3) requires that a singleton player in period 1 receives at least as
much as when entering coalition K 1 . Conditions (2) and (3) are generalisations of the notions
of internal and external stability, respectively. In what follows we will sometimes say
“coalition K 1 is generalised stable” in place of the correct but lengthy phrase “coalition K 1 is
part of a generalised stable sequence of coalitions”. This just means that no member of K 1 has
an incentive to leave and no non-member has an incentive to join.
Using definition 2 we can now establish a condition to determine whether for a given
sequence of partition functions we can find valuations (or sharing rules) such that a sequence
of coalitions is Pareto perfect. For simplicity we restrict the exposition to a time invariant
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partition function. Again, generalisations are straightforward but involve more tedious
notation.4
First, we focus on generalised internal stability. From condition (2) we can see that a coalition
K 1 can only be part of a generalised stable sequence if each member of K 1 receives at least
its defection payoff
Di ( K 1 ) ≡ Vi ( K −1 i ) + Vi ( w Kɶi2 ) .
Therefore, a necessary condition for generalised internal stability of K 1 is that the sum of
payoffs of the coalition members is at least as large as the sum of their defection payoffs:

∑ (V

i

)

( r K 1 ) + Vi ( r K 2 ) ≥
1

i∈K 1

2

∑ D (K ) .
1

i

(4)

i∈K 1

The generalised stability of K 1 depends upon defection payoffs of the members of K 1 and the
sharing rule r 2 applied in period 2; the latter only if there is some i ∈ K 1 ∩ K 2 . The defection
payoff is further specified by the partition function that determines the payoffs of the singleton
players and, hence, the period-1 outside option payoff of i ∈ K 1 , i.e. Vi ( K −1 i ) is independent of
sharing. If player i ∈ K 1 defects, then her period-2 payoff is Vi ( w Kɶi2 ) . If the player is
singleton, i.e. i ∉ Kɶ i2 , the payoff is independent of the sharing rule w. If i ∈ Kɶ i2 , then sharing
rule w applies and i receives the worst possible payoff compatible with Pareto perfection of
w

Kɶ i2 .

The next step in our argument is to determine how sharing in coalitions K 1 and K 2 can be
arranged such that condition (4) is met in all cases where this is possible for a given partition
function. To achieve this, the sharing rule r 2 applied to K 2 should distribute the coalition

4

Note that the partition function we use in sections 3 and 4 is not time-invariant.
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surplus S K 2 entirely to members of K 1 ∩ K 2 , leaving members of K 2 that are not members
of K 1 with their outside option payoff. Intuitively this rewards coalition members of the first
period and lowers their incentive for defection. Hence, by construction we have the following:
PROPOSITION 1: (i) Consider a Pareto perfect period-2 coalition K 2 . Suppose sharing in

∑

period 2 is arranged such that

i∈K 1 ∩ K 2

r1

condition (4) is not met, then

Vi ( r K 2 ) = S K 2 . Then, if for such K 2 and r 2
2

2

K 1, r K 2

is not generalised internally stable and

cannot be a Pareto perfect equilibrium for any sequence of sharing rules r 1 ,r 2 .
(ii) Again, let K 2 be Pareto perfect. Suppose sharing in period 2 is arranged as stated
under (i). Then, if for such K 2 and r 2 condition (4) is met for K 1 , then there exists a
sharing rule r 1* such that

r1*

2

K 1 , r K 2 is generalised internally stable.

Proof: We do not work out a formal proof. Part (i) follows from the construction of S. Part (ii)
follows from the fact that in (4) the period-1 coalition payoff

∑V

i

1

( r K 1 ) is independent of

i∈K 1

r 1 and from the fact that there is no restriction on r 1 . Hence, as long as (4) holds, the period-1
coalition payoff VK 1 can always be distributed in a way to meet the generalised internal
stability condition (2) for each and every i ∈ K 1 . ■
Proposition 1 allows us to identify all coalitions that can be generalised stable for a given
partition function. We call a sharing rule that satisfies (2) for all i ∈ K 1 whenever (4) is
satisfied an “optimal sharing rule”. Optimal sharing requires that r 1* is chosen such that
Vi ( r K 1 ) ≥ Di ( K 1 ) − Vi ( r K 2 ) for all i ∈ K 1 .
1*

2

Next, we turn to external stability. The following proposition establishes that external
stability, condition (3), is of little concern when an optimal sharing rule is applied.
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r2

PROPOSITION 2: Consider a Pareto perfect period-2 equilibrium

K 2 . If K 1 is

generalised externally unstable under an optimal sharing rule r 1 (applied to K +1 j ) such
that there exists j ∉ K 1 and

such that V j ( K 1 ) + V j ( r K 2 ) ≤ V j ( r K +1 j ) + V j ( w Kɶ 2j ) ,
2

1

meaning that j prefers to enter coalition K 1 under sharing rule r 1 , then the enlarged
coalition

r1

K +1 j will be generalised internally (and the equilibrium played in the

continuation game is
Proof:

By

r2

K 2 ).

assumption

V j ( r K +1 j ) + V j ( w Kɶ 2j ) ≥ V j ( K 1 ) + V j ( r K 2 ) .
1

2

By

definition.

V j ( w Kɶ 2j ) ≤ V j ( r K 2 ) . Hence, we have V j ( r K +1 j ) + V j ( r K 2 ) ≥ V j ( K 1 ) + V j ( w Kɶ 2j ) which is
2

1

2

what, according to (2), generalised internal stability of K +1 j requires. Furthermore, r 1 is an
optimal sharing rule, if (2) applies to j, then it applies to all i ∈ r K +1 j . ■
1

Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to identify the largest (or most successful) Pareto perfect
coalitions in a coalition formation game for the provision public goods. To this we turn now.
As a model with heterogeneous players does not readily yield general analytical results, we
resort to numerical simulations.

3

Numerical model and data

This section and the next provide an application. We identify the best Pareto perfect equilibria
in a greenhouse gas abatement game, that is we identify a sequence of international climate
agreements that is generalised stable and that achieves a higher global payoff than other
generalised stable agreements. The stage game we consider is standard in this domain (cf. e.g.
Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1994, Botteon and Carraro 1997, Rubio and Ulph 2007).
It consists of an announcement game followed by an abatement game. We explore this game
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper188
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as a one-shot game (i.e. with one commitment period) and with one round of renegotiations
(i.e. with two commitment periods). Formally the stage game is characterised by a set of
regions N = {1, 2,..., n} . At the beginning of commitment period t ( t = 1, 2 ) each player i
chooses from a strategy set σti ∈ {0,1} ; σti = 0 means that i is not joining the ICA in period t;
σti = 1 means that i joins the ICA in period t. As before, we denote by K t ⊆ N the set of
coalition members (signatories) in commitment period t. Now consider a given coalition K t .
Chander and Tulkens (1995) call this a ‘partial agreement’. In the period-t abatement game
members of K t act like a single player and maximise their joint payoff. They adopt GHG
abatement paths which are jointly optimal responses to others' abatement paths. Other players,
the singletons, maximise individual payoffs. They adopt abatement paths which are optimal
responses to others' emissions. Generally we denote i's GHG abatement path in period t by qit .
The period-t Nash equilibrium abatement strategy is denoted by qi*t ( K t ) . The abatement
game described generates a partition function that gives payoffs for the coalition and the
singletons for every coalition that may form.5 Generally, each player receives benefits bi from
total abatement q t = ∑ i∈N qit and incurs costs ci for own abatement qit . A singleton player
under coalition K t receives
Vi t ( K t ) = bit (q *t ( K t )) − cit (qi*t ( K t )) , for all i ∈ N \ K t .

(5)

The coalition payoff is given by

VKt t ( K t ) =

5

∑ ( b (q
t
i

i∈K

t

*t

( K t )) − cit (qi*t ( K t )) ) .

(6)

One qualification is needed. The partial agreement abatement game generates a partition function only if it has
unique solution. This condition is satisfied in the empirical setting of the STACO model.
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The partition function on which the stability analysis is based arises from the abatement game
characterised by (5) and (6).
To further specify the model, we adopt the STACO-model introduced by Finus et al. (2006)
and refined by Nagashima et al. (2006) and Weikard, Dellink and Van Ierland (2006). Here,
we focus on the main features of the model. We consider twelve world regions; USA (USA),
Japan (JPN), European Union-15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European
countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China
(CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the world
(ROW). We account for benefits from abatement to infinity, but adopt a shorter planning
horizon of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110, for determining abatement paths. In this
setting the intertemporal aspects of climate change are well reflected. Benefits from abatement
are avoided damages which, in turn, depend on stock of CO2; each region receives a share of
global benefits. As described in Dellink et al. (2004), marginal benefits can be assumed to be
constant. Marginal abatement costs are assumed to be a quadratic function of the region’s own
abatement level. The assumption of linear benefits implies that regions have dominant
strategies; the optimal response functions do neither depend on the actions of other players,
nor on the stock of greenhouse gases. We calibrate the model as far as possible (regional
emission and GDP paths, regional abatement costs) on the MIT-EPPA model (Babiker et al.
2001 and Ellerman and Decaux 1998), but as this model dos not contain a damage cost
module, we have to rely on other sources (mainly Nordhaus and Boyer 2001 and Tol 1997) for
calibrating the benefits from abatement; see Dellink et al. (2004) and Nagashima et al. (2006)
for more details.
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4

Results and discussion

This section presents the results of coalition formation for the STACO game with one
commitment period (4.1) and two commitment periods (4.2).

4.1

Optimal sharing in the one-shot game

In the one-shot game, coalition members commit to abatement and transfer paths for the full
planning period of 100 years. We find 108 stable and Pareto undominated coalitions. In Table
1 we present net present values (NPVs) and resulting CO2 concentrations for the benchmark
cases (All-Singletons and Grand Coalition) and for the best performing stable coalitions.
With asymmetric players, as in our setting, global payoff does not just depend on the number
of players in the coalition but also on their characteristics. For instance, coalitions where
China is a member will generally implement higher abatement levels than coalitions where
China is not involved. As China’s marginal abatement costs are very low compared to other
regions, the efficient division of abatement efforts will involve a substantial contribution of
China. In fact, China appears as member in all ten best-performing coalitions. Of course,
China’s involvement in a coalition requires sufficient availability of transfers – else China
would prefer to take a free-rider position. We find China in 50 out of 108 stable coalitions.
Table 2 provides more detailed information for the non-cooperative (“All-Singletons”) case,
which is dominated, and for the best performing stable coalition. We report abatement levels
and payoffs for individual regions. As a reference, abatement in 2011 and discounted payoffs
are reported. The best performing coalition consists of the USA, Central and Eastern
European Countries in Transition (EET), China, India and the Dynamic Asian Economies
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(DAE). All regions are better off under partial cooperation than in the non-cooperative
situation, showing that the gains from cooperation are substantial.

Table 1. Best performing stable coalitions – one-shot game
Coalition members

NPV of payoff
[Billion US$]

Concentrations
2110 [Gton]

All-Singletons*

5238

680

Grand Coalition*

15211

612

USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

9830

659

EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND

9810

659

EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND

9701

659

EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

9697

659

USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA

9613

660

EU15, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, BRA

9486

660

USA, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA

9484

660

EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA

9484

660

USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN

9469

660

EU15, EEX, CHN, IND, BRA
9455
* All-Singletons and Grand Coalition are not stable.

660

Table 2. Key results for selected coalitions – one-shot game*
Coalition of
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

All-Singletons

USA
JPN
EU15
OOE
EET
FSU
EEX
CHN
IND
DAE
BRA
ROW
Global

Abatement in
2011
[% of BaU
emissions]
9.9
2.5
7.6
5.6
4.4
6.7
1.9
14.8
10.5
1.9
0.1
6.3
8.0

NPV of payoff
[Billion US$]

Abatement in
2011
[% of BaU
emissions]

1117
943
1240
188
71
362
164
298
268
136
84
365
5238

13.2
2.5
7.6
5.6
28.7
6.7
1.9
50.1
37.8
18.1
0.1
6.3
16.9

NPV of payoff
[Billion US$]

NPV of
transfer
[Billion US$]

Incentive to
change signal
(NPV)
[Billion US$]

1603
1933
2595
386
138
749
336
415
485
261
172
755
9830

-663
0
0
0
64
0
0
452
83
64
0
0
0

-9
-207
-274
-19
-1
-59
-15
-2
-3
-1
-4
-60
-654

* Bold numbers indicate membership.
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The member with the highest marginal benefits from abatement in the best performing
equilibrium is the USA; thus, the transfer scheme involves a payment from the USA to the
other regions, as shown in Table 2. The low marginal abatement costs in China induce a huge
abatement effort in China and the associated costs are largely funded by the transfer scheme.
The main beneficiaries from this coalition are the two outsiders: Japan and the European
Union benefit much from the coalition’s increased abatement, compared to the All-Singletons
case. They do not increase their abatement efforts, however. This reflects the public good
characteristic of abatement. Thus, their incentive to join the coalition (to change membership)
is large and negative.

4.2

Optimal sharing in the renegotiation game

Renegotiations after 50 years
As discussed in the introduction, renegotiations may influence the outcome as players can
change their membership decision. Introducing a round of renegotiations after 50 years may
induce larger coalitions in the first stage, as non-cooperative behaviour may be punished by
playing a worse equilibrium in the second stage.
As Table 3 shows, there are multiple equilibria in the second stage. This opens possibilities
for punishment and brings about a huge number of equilibria in the first stage. Table 3 reports
NPVs of payoffs for the 10 best performing Pareto perfect coalition sequences (PPCs). The
table offers a number of interesting observations.
First, although the second stage of the game has a shorter time horizon than the one-shot
game, the best performing equilibria are largely the same. The best performing generalised
stable coalitions in the first stage are, however, more ambitious. Where in the one-shot game
46% of the potential gain from cooperation may be reaped, the two-stage game can close the
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gap between All-Singletons and the Grand Coalition by 57%. The combination of
renegotiations and a scheme of optimal transfers makes a significant difference. In
comparison, a two-stage game with an exogenous transfer rule can only reap 25% of the
potential gain (cf. Weikard, Dellink and Van Ierland 2006).
Secondly, the three best performing PPCs (and many other PPCs) contain one of the three
high damage regions (USA, Japan or EU15) in the first stage but another high damage region
in the second stage. As these regions have strong free rider incentives in the second stage
coalition, they can “persuade” another region to join the coalition in the first stage, i.e. freeriding in both stages has become more difficult due to the possibility of punishment.
Thirdly, the bonus that permanent members receive induces that many coalition members
from the second stage are also present in the first stage: EET, China and India are present in
all 10 best performing PPCs at both stages. For the regions with high marginal benefits, this
bonus is not always sufficient to compensate for the large free-rider incentives and the high
transfers that they have to pay when joining a coalition. Thus, we find that especially the
OECD regions are just temporary members of a climate coalition.
Table 3. Best performing stable coalitions – renegotiations after 50 years
Coalition members
st

NPV of payoff [billion US$]
nd

2nd st.

Total

6528

4409

10937

EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND

6528

4402

10930

EU15, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

6511

4409

10920

EU15, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW

EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND

6511

4402

10912

JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW

EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

6528

4352

10880

USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

6469

4409

10878

JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW

EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND

6528

4346

10874

USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

6463

4409

10872

USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW

EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND

6469

4402

10871

USA, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND

USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

6458

4409

10868

1 stage

2 stage

JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE

JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW
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Table 4 gives the main regional results for the best performing sequence of coalitions. As
there are no punishments in the second (last) stage by definition, the equilibria in this stage are
not only self-enforcing, but also individually beneficial: all players are worse off when they
leave the coalition, though the differences are sometimes small. This can be seen from the
negative incentives to change membership in the second stage. Note also that the USA, as the
only non-permanent member in the second stage, only receives its outside option payoff (the
permanent members divide the surplus), and thus its incentive to change membership in this
stage is exactly zero.
The punishment options are clearly visible in the incentives to change membership for the
coalition members in the first stage. All temporary coalition members would be better off if
they could free-ride and leave the coalition. Their decision is, however, not based on a simple
comparison of net benefits within the first stage, but on their net benefits over the full century.
As free-riding would be punished in the second stage and the punishments are sufficiently
severe, it is possible to enforce cooperation in the first stage. For the permanent members, the
situation is different: they can also be threatened into cooperation (i.e. the “stick” can be
used), but they benefit from the “carrot”: they divide the surplus that is generated in both
stages among themselves.
As in the one-shot game, the non-participating OECD regions, in this case USA in the first
stage and EU15 in both stages, benefit strongly from the coalition that is formed, as their
climate damages are substantially reduced, while their own abatement costs are moderate.
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Table 4. Key results for the coalition of {JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW} and
{USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} in the first and second phase, respectively – renegotiations
after 50 years*

Abatement

2011

2061

(% of BaU (% of BaU
emissions) emissions)

NPV of payoff

NPV of transfer

Incentive to change
signal (NPV)

1st commitment
period

2nd commitment
period

1st commitment
period

2nd commitment
period

1st commitment
period

2nd commitment
period

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

USA

9.9

8.7

1701

722

0

-295

-266.2

0.0

JPN

6.5

2.6

657

865

-668

0

436.1

-90.7

EU15

7.6

5.7

1817

1161

0

0

-273.3

-120.2

OOE

21.0

2.9

164

173

-47

0

87.2

-8.4

EET

33.0

17.3

122

62

80

28

-25.3

-0.7

FSU

18.4

5.0

291

336

-126

0

170.6

-25.9

EEX

1.9

1.7

235

150

0

0

-31.0

-6.7

CHN

59.0

26.8

447

188

583

200

-149.9

-2.3

IND

44.2

16.9

450

219

194

38

-107.4

-2.6

DAE

21.8

13.0

233

117

108

29

-50.4

-1.4

BRA

0.1

0.1

120

77

0

0

-18.4

-1.6

ROW

20.8

4.4

293

338

-125

0

171.9

-26.2

6528

4409

0

0

Global

* Bold numbers indicate membership.

The pattern of transfers across coalition members is largely conform expectations: the regions
with large marginal benefits benefit from the high abatement levels in the regions with low
marginal abatement costs and co-finance these high abatement levels. Furthermore, permanent
members appropriate the entire surplus generated by the coalition, and thus transfers tend to
go from temporary members to permanent members. Coalitional maximisation requires that
marginal abatement costs are equal across coalition members and equal to the sum of marginal
benefits of all coalition members. For singletons, marginal abatement costs equal their own
marginal benefits.
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Optimal renegotiation time
Earlier renegotiations may induce even larger coalitions in the first stage, as second stage
payoffs are large compared to first stage payoffs. Thus, the threats that can be imposed on
regions in the first stage are relatively large. As it is likely that the first stage generalised
stable coalitions are more ambitious than the stable coalitions in the second stage (see also
Weikard, Dellink and Van Ierland, 2006) and the first stage is now relatively short, this may
not increase the performance of the resulting equilibria over the century. It may, however,
boost cooperation in the first stage. While earlier renegotiations thus increase threats that help
to stabilise larger coalitions, later renegotiations maintain the benefits of a larger coalition for
longer. As these two mechanisms counteract each other, there is an optimal renegotiation
moment where the additional benefit from high ambition balances with prolonged ambition in
the first phase.
We find that the moment of renegotiation only affects the equilibria that emerge in the first
commitment period, as shown in Table 5. Stability in the second commitment period is robust
with respect to the length of the period. In the first commitment period, however, the
possibilities for credible punishment are crucial in the stabilisation of more ambitious
coalitions: the later the renegotiations, the weaker the threats and hence the less ambitious the
best performing PPCs.
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Table 5. Key results for different moments of renegotiations
Best performing RPC
Renegotiations
after ... years
Members 1st commitment period

Members 2nd commitment
period

NPV of
payoff

Concentrations 2110

10

USA, JPN, EU15, OOE, EET, FSU,
EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

10451

657

20

USA, JPN, EU15, OOE, EET, FSU,
EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

11073

654

30

USA, JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX,
CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

11431

654

40

USA, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND,
DAE, BRA, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

11238

655

50

JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND,
DAE, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

10937

655

60

USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

10647

656

70

USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

10397

657

80

EU15, EET, CHN, IND, ROW

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

10096

657

90

USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND

USA, EET, CHN, IND,
DAE

9938

658

When the renegotiation moment is sufficiently early, the Grand Coalition can be stabilised in
the first commitment period. In fact, most large coalitions are generalised stable when
renegotiations are held after 10 or 20 years, including the 11-player coalitions where Brazil or
Japan free-ride. The intuition behind this result is that these two regions have very steep
marginal abatement cost curves. Their participation in the coalition requires that even though
they are temporary members and will not get more than their outside-option payoff, a
substantial share of the surplus generated by the coalition would go to these regions to
compensate their high abatement costs. But their participation would hardly benefit other
regions, as their abatement levels would remain relatively small.
Because the larger stable coalitions exist for a shorter first commitment period, they do not
contribute very much to the payoff over the entire planning horizon. Although the Grand
Coalition is stabilised when renegotiations are held after 20 years, only 59% of the total
potential gains of cooperation are reaped (100% in the first stage, 46% in the second stage).
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The best moment to renegotiate, in terms of maximising payoff of the best performing RPC, is
after 30 years: this balances a sufficiently long first commitment period to enable prolonged
strong abatement policies with sufficiently high threats to ensure stability of this ambitious
coalition in the first commitment period. In this case, 62% of the potential gains of
cooperation are reaped. By contrast, the worst renegotiation moment is after 90 years, where
only 47% of the potential gains may be reaped – hardly better than what can be achieved in
the one-shot game.
Table 6. Key results for the coalition of {USA, JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE,
BRA, ROW} and {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} in the first and second phase, respectively –
renegotiations after 30 years

Abatement

2011

2041

(% of BaU (% of BaU
emissions) emissions)

NPV of payoff

NPV of transfer

Incentive to change
signal (NPV)

1st commitment
period

2nd commitment
period

1st commitment
period

2nd commitment
period

1st commitment
period

2nd commitment
period

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

Billion
US$

USA

19.7

10.6

1570

1071

323

-434

-425.9

-5.9

JPN

9.4

2.8

353

1282

-779

0

650.2

-135.5

EU15

7.6

6.5

1577

1721

0

0

-291.5

-179.3

OOE

26.1

3.8

90

256

-73

0

130.0

-12.5

EET

41.4

20.7

76

92

60

41

8.0

-0.5

FSU

22.9

5.3

153

497

-170

0

254.4

-38.7

EEX

23.9

1.8

76

223

-22

0

113.1

-10.0

CHN

76.5

30.6

359

277

688

296

-94.0

-1.5

IND

56.6

21.3

303

322

128

54

-1.9

-1.8

DAE

29.2

15.1

148

173

65

42

11.2

-1.0

BRA

5.1

0.1

44

114

-52

0

57.7

-2.4

ROW

26.5

4.9

154

501

-168

0

256.3

-39.2

4902

6529

0

0

Global

* Bold numbers indicate membership.

The regional results of the overall best performing PPCs are presented in Table 6. The most
striking result is that all signatories that are not remaining in the coalition in the second stage
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have an incentive to leave the coalition in the first stage, if they would not be punished in the
second stage. For some regions, abatement levels are very large in the first stage, especially
for China and India. In the absence of transfers, China would lose more than 300 billion US$
on their own abatement efforts.6 Clearly, they need to be compensated for this with substantial
transfers. Japan is willing to provide these transfers, as its benefits from global abatement are
very high. The USA has a prominent position in this equilibrium: they benefit from the large
credible threats that enforce an ambitious coalition in the first stage, and they benefit from the
division of surplus among permanent members. In absolute terms (NPV of payoff), they are
the main beneficiary of the agreement, together with the European Union (EU15), who benefit
from free riding.
Figure 1 shows annual global abatement percentages for the best performing PPC of the
different specifications and, for comparison, for the All-Singletons case. In all cases,
abatement percentages are falling for the first 7 decades, but increase slightly thereafter. The
falling percentages are caused by increases in baseline emission levels that have a bigger
impact than the increased abatement levels induced by technological progress. The slowdown
of emission growth in the later decades causes abatement percentages to slightly increase
towards the end of the century (cf. Nagashima et al. 2005). The figure clearly shows the tradeoff between ambition level and duration of the first commitment period, and also shows that
the optimal transfer scheme is able to induce substantially higher abatement levels throughout
the century than when no agreement is signed.

6

This can be seen in the table as the payoff minus the transfers received.
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40%

Ren. after 10 yrs
Ren. after 20 yrs
Ren. after 30 yrs
Ren. after 40 yrs
Ren. after 50 yrs
Ren. after 60 yrs
Ren. after 70 yrs
Ren. after 80 yrs
Ren. after 90 yrs
All-Singletons

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%

2100

2090

2080

2070

2060

2050

2040

2030

2020

2010

0%

Figure 1. Global emission reductions in percentages for the All-Singletons case and the best
performing PPCs in the different simulations

Conclusion
Although our analysis employs a cautious equilibrium concept – we assume that a region
would defect from a coalition if its free-rider payoff is larger than its payoff in the coalition – ,
we find equilibria with a large degree of cooperation. Our findings are in contrast to many
other studies that find only small stable coalitions consisting of no more than two or three
players; see e.g. the Barrett’s (1994) theoretical analysis and the analysis of Finus et al. (2006)
using the STACO model. There are three main drivers of our results. First, a well-designed
transfer scheme is a useful tool to stabilise larger coalitions, as in our setting players differ in
marginal benefits and marginal cost. Second, the transfer scheme that we suggest is
specifically designed to increase the incentives to join the coalition. With such optimal
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transfers internal stability can be achieved for the largest possible set of coalitions. Third, we
introduce renegotiations. A later commitment period can be used to threaten potential freeriders into cooperation. Together, these sticks and carrots provide substantial incentives to
stabilise more successful international climate coalitions.
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